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 1 
Abstract  45 
Humans adaptively perform actions to achieve their goals. This ﬂexible behaviour requires two 46 
core abilities: the ability to anticipate the outcomes of candidate actions and the ability to select 47 
and implement actions in a goal-directed manner. The ability to predict outcomes has been 48 
extensively researched in reinforcement learning paradigms, but this work has often focused on 49 
simple actions that are not embedded in hierarchical and sequential structures that are 50 
characteristic of goal-directed human behaviour. On the other hand, the ability to select actions in 51 
accordance with high-level task goals, particularly in the presence of alternative responses and 52 
salient distractors, has been widely researched in cognitive control paradigms. Cognitive control 53 
research, however, has often paid less attention to the role of action outcomes. The present review 54 
attempts to bridge these accounts by proposing an outcome-guided mechanism for selection of 55 
extended actions. Our proposal builds on constructs from the hierarchical reinforcement learning 56 
literature, which emphasises the concept of reaching and evaluating informative states, i.e., states 57 
that constitute subgoals in complex actions. We develop an account of the neural mechanisms that 58 
allow outcome-guided action selection to be achieved in a network that relies on projections from 59 
cortical areas to the basal ganglia and back-projections from the basal ganglia to the cortex. These 60 
cortico-basal ganglia-thalamo-cortical ‘loops’ allow convergence - and thus integration - of 61 
information from non-adjacent cortical areas (for example between sensory and motor 62 
representations). This integration is essential in action sequences, for which achieving an 63 
anticipated sensory state signals the successful completion of an action. We further describe how 64 
projection pathways within the basal ganglia allow selection between representations, which may 65 
pertain to movements, actions, or extended action plans. The model lastly envisages a role for 66 
hierarchical projections from the striatum to dopaminergic midbrain areas that enable more rostral 67 
frontal areas to bias the selection of inputs from more posterior frontal areas via their respective 68 
representations in the basal ganglia.  69 
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Adaptive human behaviour relies on the capacity to select and perform actions in accordance with 78 
desired outcomes. This requires at least two abilities: the ability to predict outcomes, and the 79 
ability to select actions (or sets of actions) on the basis of these predictions to achieve specific 80 
goals. These two aspects have to some degree been researched separately in neuroscience and 81 
psychology. The ability to predict outcomes has been extensively investigated using learning 82 
paradigms (O’Doherty, 2004; Pessiglione et al., 2006; Tricomi and Fiez, 2008; Walsh and 83 
Anderson, 2012) in both human subjects (Holroyd and Coles, 2002; O’Doherty, 2004) and 84 
animals (Matsumoto et al., 2009; Schultz and Dickinson, 2000; Wise, 2004). Here, the main focus 85 
has been the prediction of primary rewards or aversive events (Hikosaka et al., 2008; Matsumoto 86 
and Hikosaka, 2007; Schultz and Dickinson, 2000) and the mechanisms of reinforcement learning 87 
that translate these predictions into observed behaviour at the level of individual stimuli and 88 
speciﬁc actions (Schultz, Dayan, and Montague, 1997). This line of work has paid much less 89 
attention to the question of how action selection is guided by high-level goals and by outcomes 90 
that inform on the successful completion of an action in the absence of measurable reward. 91 
The ability to guide behaviour in accordance with high-level goals has received substantial 92 
scrutiny in human cognitive neuroscience. Here the focus has been on the ability to select and 93 
implement task sets that specify appropriate mappings from environmental stimuli to behavioural 94 
responses to suit current task demands (Monsell, 1996), particularly in the presence of salient 95 
distractors or habitual alternate actions (Miller and Cohen, 2001; Norman and Shallice, 1986), 96 
subsumed under the concept of cognitive control (Monsell and Driver, 2000). However, this 97 
framework has tended to neglect a fundamental feature of behaviour, that actions are usually 98 
directed toward achieving particular outcomes. In contrast, many commonly used cognitive 99 
control paradigms—such as task switching, response conflict, and response inhibition—feature 100 
responses that have no direct consequences. Instead, execution of the required response is 101 
considered to represent completion of the task.  102 
Here we explore recent ideas that promise to bring together prior research on outcome 103 
prediction and cognitive control and thus contribute to the development of unifying accounts of 104 
adaptive action selection. In the ﬁrst half of this article, we brieﬂy review foundational concepts in 105 
research on cognitive control and reinforcement learning, before presenting hierarchical models of 106 
reinforcement learning as a promising framework for linking ideas from these two hitherto rather 107 
separate domains of research. A key feature of these hierarchical models is their proposal that 108 
actions are not selected in isolation, but instead are learnt and selected in structured sequences that 109 
are directed toward identiﬁed goals. Crucially, these structured sequences bear strong conceptual 110 
 3 
resemblance to the notion of task sets in theories of cognitive control. However, an important 111 
limitation in current theories of hierarchical reinforcement learning is that they fail to specify 112 
clearly the neural mechanisms supporting sequential action selection. In the second half of this 113 
article, we propose that structured sequencing of actions depends critically on the basal ganglia 114 
and their interactions with frontal cortex. We review neurophysiological, anatomical, and 115 
neuropsychological evidence in support of this claim. We conclude by outlining promising 116 
directions for future research to test these proposals.  117 
 118 
1 Cognitive Control  119 
 120 
1.1 Goal-directed behaviour  121 
In research on cognitive control, a founding observation is that human behaviour is highly 122 
ﬂexible and, as a consequence, highly under-constrained by the environment (Allport, 1980; 123 
Miller and Cohen, 2001; Monsell, 1996; Norman and Shallice, 1986). Presented with stimuli as 124 
simple as written words on a computer screen, for example, experimental subjects are capable of 125 
an enormous variety of responses: reading the words aloud, counting their syllables, counting the 126 
vowels, providing rhymes, judging whether they refer to concrete objects or abstract ideas, giving 127 
synonyms, searching for particular target letters, etc., etc. Given this ﬂexibility, mechanisms of 128 
cognitive control are required to guide action selection according to current goals and intentions 129 
(Miller and Cohen, 2001; Norman and Shallice, 1986), a function of particular importance when a 130 
number of possible actions have to be coordinated. This coordination is thought to depend on 131 
establishing an effective organization—a task set—that speciﬁes the stimuli to be attended, the 132 
type of response to be made, and the appropriate mapping between these stimuli and responses 133 
(Monsell, 1996).  134 
A classical test of cognitive control is therefore the task-switching paradigm (Jersild, 135 
1927), in which participants are presented with a series of stimuli (such as digits) and are required 136 
to make rapid and ﬂexible switches between two or more tasks (such as judging whether the digit 137 
is odd or even, versus judging whether it is greater or less than 5). Subjects are typically told 138 
which task to perform for each presented stimulus, either trial-by-trial through instructional cues 139 
or according to a predictable schedule, but are sometimes given freedom of choice. Regardless, 140 
each task switch requires them to disregard the current task set and establish a new one, a process 141 
associated with a cost in performance and associated activity across a network of frontoparietal 142 
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cortical regions implicated in cognitive control (Dosenbach et al., 2006; Duncan, 2010; Kim et al., 143 
2012; Richter and Yeung, 2014). The established task set is needed to facilitate repeated 144 
performance of the same tasks on multiple stimuli, and to shield performance against interference 145 
from competing stimulus-response mappings (Collins and Frank, 2013; Collins, Cavanagh, and 146 
Frank, 2014; Dreisbach and Haider, 2008).  147 
Many other well-established cognitive control paradigms share this focus on ‘willful’ goal-148 
driven task implementation, including the go/no-go, Stroop, and Eriksen ﬂanker tasks, to name a 149 
few. These tasks all share the critical feature that one of a number of possible responses must be 150 
selected or withheld (go/no-go) according to a cue (task-switching, go/no-go) or predeﬁned rule 151 
(Stroop, ﬂanker), often in the face of competition from more habitual responses to that stimulus 152 
(Stroop). Evidence from these various tasks has converged on a core set of processing principles: 153 
ﬁrst, that behaviour emerges from competitive interactions among representations of potential 154 
stimuli and responses; second, that this competition occurs simultaneously at multiple levels of 155 
processing (e.g., in the visual system from representations of simple features to complex objects); 156 
and, ﬁnally, that competition operates under the guiding inﬂuence of goal representations in 157 
prefrontal cortex (Desimone and Duncan, 1995). This research has been highly successful in 158 
characterising the computational (Miller and Cohen, 2001) and neural (Sakai, 2008) bases of this 159 
top-down inﬂuence. Speciﬁcally, it is commonly held that prefrontal cortex maintains stable 160 
representations of task-relevant information and current task goals (a working memory function). 161 
This information is held to modulate processing in sensory and motor cortices, as well as the 162 
interaction between them, in service of effective task performance.  163 
 164 
1.2 Hierarchical structure  165 
Accumulating evidence suggests that cognitive control is not a unitary construct but can instead be 166 
fractionated into interacting component processes with distinct and identiﬁable neural bases. For 167 
example, interactions between prefrontal cortex and the medial temporal lobe appear to support 168 
retrieval of goals, set during earlier prospective planning (Cohen and O’Reilly, 1996; Schacter, 169 
Addis, and Buckner, 2007), with input from orbitofrontal cortex providing information about the 170 
likely payoffs of those plans (Koechlin and Hyaﬁl, 2007) and input from medial prefrontal cortex 171 
providing more negatively valenced information about costs and uncertainty (Behrens et al., 2007; 172 
Botvinick, 2007).  173 
Of particular relevance to the present discussion is the proposal that regions in prefrontal 174 
cortex are specialised for representing actions at different levels of abstraction (Badre and 175 
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D’Esposito, 2009; Koechlin and Summerﬁeld, 2007; but see Duncan, 2010 for a dissenting view). 176 
It has long been recognised that behaviour is hierarchically structured, with high-level plans (e.g., 177 
get to work on time) comprised of sub-routines (e.g., make breakfast, pack a bag, walk to the 178 
office) that themselves involve lower-level sub-routines (e.g., make coffee, toast bread). These 179 
abstraction hierarchies nearly always exhibit a sequential structure, such that sub-routines are 180 
executed in a natural or necessary ordering at each level of the hierarchy. As such, action selection 181 
can be characterised in terms of activation ﬂow in a hierarchy from the high-level plan down to 182 
the particular sequences of concrete actions that are ultimately speciﬁed for execution (Lashley, 183 
1951; Miller, Galanter, and Pribram, 1960).  184 
This form of hierarchical structure is common in cognitive theories of action selection 185 
(Botvinick and Plaut, 2004; Cooper and Shallice, 2000). Recent neuroimaging evidence suggests 186 
that corresponding hierarchical structure is explicitly represented along the rostro-caudal axis of 187 
lateral prefrontal cortex, with more rostral regions containing increasingly higher-level 188 
representations of actions. For example, whereas activity in premotor cortex is observed when 189 
coloured cues indicate the required response, activity in the inferior frontal gyrus becomes 190 
apparent when coloured cues indicate the overall task (i.e., how to respond to other stimulus 191 
attributes) rather than a particular action, while activity in rostral prefrontal cortex only becomes 192 
apparent when these cue-task contingencies switch (Koechlin, Ody, and Kouneiher, 2003). 193 
Collectively, this evidence suggests an important elaboration of the concept of cognitive control, 194 
in which goals are simultaneously represented at multiple levels of abstraction in distinct parts of 195 
prefrontal cortex, with inﬂuence ﬂowing down hierarchically from high-level plans to speciﬁc 196 
implemented actions.  197 
 198 
1.3 Concrete goals and sequential actions  199 
The work sketched in the preceding subsections is illustrative of substantial progress made in our 200 
understanding of the computational and neural mechanisms of cognitive control. However, these 201 
successes notwithstanding, a striking feature of many standard cognitive control paradigms is their 202 
narrow focus on tasks in which actions are produced in a stimulus-driven and reactive manner, 203 
with success in the task deﬁned in terms of producing pre-deﬁned responses to given stimuli rather 204 
than in terms of bringing about a desired state of affairs in the world (Hommel, 2009). For 205 
example, in prior research on ﬂexible task switching, the moment of response execution is 206 
typically taken to be the end of the trial. Even trial-to-trial feedback is rarely provided, a choice 207 
that follows the lead of three studies that laid the methodological foundations of this work 208 
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(Allport, Styles, and Hsieh, 1994; Meiran, 1996; Rogers and Monsell, 1995 - only Meiran’s 209 
Experiment 4 included trial-to-trial feedback of any kind). Given this, it is perhaps not surprising 210 
that few studies since have explicitly manipulated action outcomes in task switching, with the 211 
notable exception of experiments using adaptations of the Wisconsin Card Sorting Task in which 212 
subjects must use trial-to-trial feedback to infer a sorting rule (e.g., Monchi et al., 2001; Rogers et 213 
al., 1998) and a handful of studies using reward incentives to motivate effective switching 214 
(Kleinsorge and Rinkenauer, 2012; Nieuwenhuis and Monsell, 2002; Shen and Chun, 2011). 215 
References to feedback and action outcomes are notable by their absence in recent authoritative 216 
reviews of task-switching research (Grange & Houghton, 2014; Kiesel et al., 2010; 217 
Vandierendonck, Liefooghe, and Verbruggen, 2010) as well as in the related research literatures 218 
on response conﬂict (MacLeod, 1991; Yeung, 2013) and response inhibition (Aron, Robbins, and 219 
Poldrack, 2014). One domain in which the role of outcomes in cognitive control has been studied 220 
in more detail is in terms of performance feedback (Ridderinkhof et al., 2004; Walsh and 221 
Anderson, 2012), but with a few important exceptions (Ribas-Fernandes et al., 2011; Krigolson 222 
and Holroyd, 2006; Collins and Frank, 2013), this work has focused on learning and optimisation 223 
of simple stimulus-response associations rather than high-level task sets. Moreover, feedback in 224 
these studies is typically used to indicate whether the subject produced the required response to 225 
the imperative stimulus, rather than being a meaningful consequence of the particular action 226 
produced.  227 
In stark contrast, in almost all complex everyday behaviours, our actions are instrumentally 228 
directed towards achieving certain desired outcomes or producing speciﬁc changes in the 229 
environment. Thus, successful completion of an action is typically deﬁned in terms of bringing 230 
about its desired outcome, not in terms of its execution per se (i.e., we deﬁne success in terms of 231 
ends not means). Success is a light turning on rather than a switch being ﬂicked, a hot cup of 232 
coffee in our hands rather than completion of pouring and stirring actions, a draft manuscript 233 
rather than a long sequence of keypresses. Action outcomes of this sort have no obvious correlate 234 
in many cognitive control tasks, for which action execution marks the end of the trial and in which 235 
feedback is often not provided (and, when provided, may be unnecessary except during the earliest 236 
stages of practice; Holroyd and Coles, 2002). As such, previous research on cognitive control may 237 
have neglected a critical route by which tasks and actions are selected, that is, through the 238 
outcomes they are intended to achieve.  239 
A second key feature of everyday action that is missing from standard cognitive control 240 
paradigms is sequential structure. With a few notable exceptions (e.g., Schneider and Logan, 241 
 7 
2006), these paradigms involve a series of discrete trials in which no explicit structure governs the 242 
relationship between successive events. Indeed, the most common approach is to deliberately 243 
randomise the order of presented stimuli and required tasks and responses (Richter and Yeung, 244 
2014). This design choice is true even for paradigms that notionally tap hierarchical behavioural 245 
structure (e.g., Koechlin, Ody, and Kouneiher, 2003). As such, these paradigms share little in 246 
common with everyday behaviour which, as already noted above, is characterised by hierarchical 247 
and sequential structure: Plans at a given level of abstraction typically comprise a series of sub-248 
routines for which the order is at least somewhat constrained (e.g., in my morning routine, I must 249 
get out of bed before I can make coffee or shower, but the order of the latter two sub-routines can 250 
be exchanged; Botvinick and Plaut, 2004). Action outcomes play a critical role in this behavioural 251 
sequencing, because it is often the case that those outcomes are necessary preconditions for later 252 
actions in a sequence: success in picking up a spoon allows me next to add coffee grounds to the 253 
pot.  254 
Thus, while cognitive neuroscience research has been highly successful in characterising 255 
the computational mechanisms and neural basis of control, it has achieved this in the context of 256 
task paradigms that neglect crucial features of human behaviour. This narrow focus may at least 257 
partly explain why lesion studies have often found little or no substantive impact on cognitive 258 
control of damage to regions that consistently show control-related activation in imaging studies 259 
(Holroyd and Yeung, 2012). This is not to say, however, that there has been no research on the 260 
outcome-driven, sequential nature of behaviour; indeed this has been a major focus of research, 261 
albeit largely separate from the work reviewed above. It is to this research that we now turn.  262 
 263 
2 Action Outcomes  264 
 265 
2.1 Action effects  266 
Actions typically have sensory consequences: some that are intrinsic to the intended goal (e.g., a 267 
light turning on at the ﬂick of a switch), some that are intrinsic to the action itself (e.g., the 268 
proprioceptive consequences of ﬁnger ﬂexion), and some that are incidental but nevertheless 269 
consistently associated (e.g., the auditory click of the switch). A large corpus of ﬁndings has 270 
documented the formation of associations between actions and these sensory consequences 271 
(Herwig and Waszak, 2009; Herwig, Prinz, and Waszak, 2007; Kühn et al., 2010; Waszak et al., 272 
2005; Krieghoﬀ  et al., 2011), for example as investigated according to the ideomotor principle of 273 
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action selection (James, 1890; Prinz, 1990; Greenwald, 1970; Hommel, 2009). According to this 274 
research, sensory consequences of actions become part of the internal representation of actions 275 
(Hommel, 2009; Band et al., 2009) and therefore play a crucial role in action selection (e.g. 276 
Hommel, 2009). For example, after learning that particular actions have consistent sensory 277 
consequences (e.g., pressing a key produces a low-frequency tone), presentation of those 278 
‘consequences’ prior to action selection biases action selection toward the associated action 279 
(Elsner and Hommel, 2001).  280 
The acquisition and maintenance of functional representations necessitate not only the 281 
ability to predict which action leads to which outcome, but also the ability to assess whether 282 
events and outcomes concur with original predictions. This mechanism of prediction and 283 
evaluation is reminiscent of forward models in motor control (Blakemore and Sirigu, 2003; 284 
Wolpert and Miall, 1996; Wolpert and Kawato, 1998). In these models, every mismatch between 285 
predicted and actual sensory feedback is indicative of an error and hence the need for adjustment. 286 
These forward models can also usefully be run offline, without actual movement. Through this 287 
mechanism, they can be used to estimate what the sensory consequence of a possible movement 288 
would be, and thereby select and adjust movements based on the predicted divergence between 289 
this anticipated consequence and the planned motor command (Blakemore and Sirigu, 2003; 290 
Miall, 2003; Schaal, Mohajerian, and Ijspeert, 2007; Wolpert and Miall, 1996; Wolpert and 291 
Kawato, 1998). There is ample evidence for neural activity corresponding to such outcome-292 
centred routines of prediction, evaluation, and adjustment in motor control (Tunik, Houk, and 293 
Grafton, 2009). 294 
However, this research has to date made limited contact with studies of cognitive control. 295 
In the present context, the critical missing conceptual link is the idea that action-effect predictions 296 
ought to depend on the overarching task goal in two key respects. First, as noted above, some 297 
sensory consequences are intrinsic to the action whereas others are incidental, and we might 298 
expect differential processing of these even if the action-effect correlations are equivalent. There 299 
is some evidence on this point (e.g., Krigolson and Holroyd, 2006), but little systematic study. 300 
Second, predictions ought to be task-dependent. For example, the same action (e.g., a ﬂick of 301 
switch) will have different predicted consequences in the context of different tasks (e.g., turning 302 
on a light vs. turning on an electrical socket), yet action-effect bindings are commonly studied in 303 
the context of tasks with ﬁxed action-effect associations. As such, while studies of sensory action 304 
effects clearly demonstrate the principle that outcomes play a critical role in adaptive action 305 
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selection, this research has less to say about the role of action outcomes in the higher-level control 306 
of behaviour.  307 
 308 
2.2 Reward and reinforcement learning  309 
Perhaps the best-characterised form of action-outcome learning relates to associations involving 310 
motivationally salient events: reward and punishment. The topic of reinforcement learning has 311 
become a major focus in neuroscience research, with interest fuelled by the striking convergence 312 
between formal computational theory and observed properties of neural systems underpinning 313 
learning in humans and other animals. Reinforcement learning theory (RL; Schultz, Dayan, and 314 
Montague, 1997; Sutton, 1988; Sutton and Barto, 1990; Sutton and Barto, 1981) explains how 315 
agents (humans/animals) learn to choose actions that will maximise their future rewards (Barto 316 
and Simsek, 2005). The agent assigns a value to a given state, which signiﬁes how much reward 317 
this state predicts, and learns which actions lead to transitions from one state to the next. In 318 
accordance with Thorndike’s law of effect (Thorndike, 1927), actions that lead to rewarding states 319 
are more likely to be repeated in the future.  320 
Take for example a case of searching for groceries in a foreign country on a Sunday, when 321 
shops are closed. Your foraging may eventually lead you to a gas station, which you enter, and 322 
wherein to your surprise you ﬁnd food and drink. This experience may change the value you 323 
ascribe to gas stations, and make trips to the gas station more likely on future Sundays. RL 324 
describes learning processes such as this: If reward is delivered unexpectedly, the present state 325 
will be assigned a higher value than it had before (because it is now recognised as a state that may 326 
yield reward). At the same time, the value of the state(s) that preceded the present state will also 327 
be increased because they predict future reward. Actions that lead to states that promise reward 328 
will be produced more often. The unexpected delivery of reward is called a positive reward 329 
prediction error, because a state yielded more reward than previously expected. The next time the 330 
same sequence of states is encountered, reward delivery will have been predicted to some degree 331 
(depending on the learning rate) by the previous state. This makes reward less unexpected and 332 
hence decreases the positive reward prediction error (Schultz et al., 1992; Schultz, Dayan, and 333 
Montague, 1997; Schultz, 2007). To refer back to our example, on another foraging trip a week 334 
later, ﬁnding food at the gas station would not be such a large positive surprise, but ﬁnding the gas 335 
station to be closed might prompt disappointment (negative prediction error).  336 
The aim in RL is to choose the action that will lead to the highest expectation of future 337 
reward (discounted for time-to-reward). The underlying routine can be understood as a constant 338 
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prediction of future outcomes paired with the evaluation of the present state with regards to 339 
whether it yielded the outcomes it was predicted to yield. Deviations from predictions cause 340 
prediction errors and result in adjustment of the model, i.e., learning.  341 
 342 
2.3 Hierarchical reinforcement learning  343 
Hierarchical reinforcement learning (HRL) is a development of RL theory that aims to 344 
deliver computationally more tractable solutions for complex environments than ‘ﬂat’ RL. 345 
Crucially for our purposes here, HRL theory also has interesting implications for the role of 346 
outcome and task representations in cognitive control (Collins and Frank, 2013; Collins & 347 
Koechlin, 2012). One computational issue for reinforcement learning is that its sequential nature 348 
poses a scaling problem (see Botvinick, Niv, and Barto, 2009, for review). The computational 349 
demands for the learning agent increase with each step and each action, rendering complicated 350 
multistep actions computationally unfeasible. HRL circumvents this problem by enabling actions 351 
to be selected and learnt in coherent sequences. For example, within the options framework 352 
(Botvinick, Niv, and Barto, 2009; Holroyd and Yeung, 2012), primitive actions can be compiled 353 
into higher-level mini policies, or options, that guide the selection of action sequences. Because 354 
the action sequence encompassed in each option is treated as a chunk, it can be selected in its 355 
entirety, as opposed to selecting single actions at a time, with the potential to greatly simplify 356 
learning in complex task domains. Indeed, options can themselves be sequenced and compiled 357 
into higher-level options, allowing for yet further simpliﬁcation of the task space. Importantly, 358 
learning occurs according to the same principles as standard RL: options that produce better-than-359 
expected outcomes are reinforced, while successful completion of a selected option reinforces 360 
preceding lower-level actions. In this way, learning is achieved simultaneously at multiple levels 361 
of abstraction, identifying high-level options as well as low-level actions that produce positive 362 
outcomes.  363 
Options are associated with probable end-states, which can be conceived of as subgoals. 364 
Subgoals are anticipated outcomes, but not necessarily primary rewards: They can be states that 365 
allow the selection of other actions that will ultimately deliver reward. This feature is of great 366 
relevance. As discussed previously, we choose actions to achieve desired outcomes, which in 367 
everyday life may not necessarily be primary rewards. If we start the day by choosing to go into 368 
work to teach a class, arriving at work is an important subgoal that informs us we are on the right 369 
track. Arriving at work, however, is not itself a primary reward. Attaining or failing to attain a 370 
subgoal is informative and relies on the same routine of prediction and evaluation as appraisal of 371 
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primary reinforcers does in RL (Diuk et al., 2013; Ribas-Fernandes et al., 2011). The idea here is 372 
that a wide array of sensory inputs can fulfil a function similar to that of reward, if these inputs 373 
deliver reliable information about the state of the environment (or the agent in the environment). 374 
Meanwhile, many human studies use abstract feedback symbols such as point scores, colours, or 375 
icons which may (Holroyd et al., 2004; Nieuwenhuis et al., 2005; Yeung and Sanfey, 2004), but 376 
need not (Elliott, Frith, and Dolan, 1997; Klein et al., 2007; Nieuwenhuis et al., 2005; Swanson 377 
and Tricomi, 2014; Ullsperger and von Cramon, 2003), represent a monetary outcome (see 378 
Kringelbach et al., 2003; Seitz, Kim, and Watanabe, 2009 for paradigms using actual primary 379 
reward). Clearly, these symbolic sensory events need to be cognitively interpreted as valuable 380 
states to assume the characteristics of reward. The degree of abstraction and the temporal 381 
extension of the plans humans pursue, such as succeeding as a teacher or publishing an article, call 382 
for neural mechanisms of learning that can signal whether events occur as expected, even if they 383 
are temporally and/or conceptually distant from primary reward delivery. In sum, a crucial feature 384 
of HRL is that it encompasses the concept of reaching informative states, which permit evaluation 385 
of a completed set of actions and afford the selection of a new series of actions to approach an 386 
overarching goal. This concept is intuitively appealing when considering the role of outcomes in 387 
everyday actions. The HRL framework also promotes the idea that neural structures known to 388 
code for reward prediction may be involved more generally in event/state prediction and coding of 389 
mismatches between anticipated (intended) states and actual outcomes.  390 
 391 
2.4 HRL and cognitive control  392 
Research on RL and its recent extension in HRL has been exceptionally successful in 393 
characterising the acquisition and evaluation of reward predictions. Crucial for our purposes, HRL 394 
is also of direct relevance to addressing the limitations of cognitive control research identiﬁed 395 
above. There, we noted that this research has adopted a narrow conception of ‘goals’ that does not 396 
capture the intuitive notion that goals fundamentally relate to states of the world brought about by 397 
our actions, and that it relatedly fails to capture the idea that human behaviour is intrinsically 398 
structured and sequential in nature. HRL addresses precisely these features: Within RL, actions 399 
are reinforced in proportion to their individual propensity to bring about states of the world 400 
associated with positive outcomes; within HRL, positive reinforcement can occur for structured 401 
sets and sequences of actions, and can be brought about in terms of informative as well as 402 
rewarding world states. Thus, actions in HRL are truly goal-directed. They are also structured, by 403 
virtue of being compiled into nested hierarchies of options.  404 
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Importantly, the concept of  options bears close resemblance to that of task sets (Collins 405 
and Frank, 2013) studied in research on cognitive control, particularly in light of recent proposals 406 
about hierarchical representations in prefrontal cortex (Botvinick, Niv, and Barto, 2009; Collins, 407 
Cavanagh, and Frank, 2014). This parallel has been developed elsewhere to link computational 408 
theories and neuroimaging studies of hierarchical control (Botvinick, 2008), and to reconcile 409 
apparent discrepancies between imaging and lesion data on the neural mechanisms of cognitive 410 
control (Holroyd and Yeung, 2012). These proposals have emphasised key similarities between 411 
options and task sets: Both are representations that are abstracted over low-level actions to specify 412 
coherent groupings of responses; both are proposed to be selected and activated in a hierarchical 413 
fashion, with ﬂow-down of activation that guides selection of increasingly concrete and speciﬁc 414 
action plans; and both are held to guide behaviour over extended periods.  415 
There is clear convergence in terms of the proposed neural underpinnings of HRL in recent 416 
accounts (Botvinick, Niv, and Barto, 2009; Holroyd and Yeung, 2012). In particular, high-level 417 
option representations are proposed to depend crucially on lateral prefrontal cortex (Botvinick, 418 
Niv, and Barto, 2009), with input from orbitofrontal and perhaps medial prefrontal regions 419 
(Holroyd and Yeung, 2012), and with representations in these regions inﬂuencing action selection 420 
in the basal ganglia under the inﬂuence of reward. This network description has recently been 421 
extended to include the proposal that the orbitofrontal cortex (OFC) represents states that afford 422 
speciﬁc options (Stalnaker et al., 2014; Wilson et al., 2014). In this way, knowledge of the 423 
physiology of prediction, evaluation, and action selection from reinforcement learning research 424 
may deliver valuable insights into the mechanisms by which outcomes may globally inﬂuence 425 
action selection and cognitive control. However, extant proposals have had little to say about the 426 
neural mechanisms underpinning a fundamental component of the HRL system: the sequencing of 427 
actions within a chosen option. This is the question addressed in the second half of this article, in 428 
which we propose a model of the neuroanatomy and neurophysiology of sequential structure in 429 
adaptive action selection.  430 
 431 
3 The neurophysiology of outcome predictions  432 
 433 
3.1 Dopaminergic signalling of prediction error  434 
The role of dopamine and dopaminergic projection pathways in RL was established by the seminal 435 
ﬁnding that positive reward prediction errors lead to phasic increases in cell ﬁring in the ventral 436 
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tegmental area and substantia nigra in the midbrain (Schultz et al., 1992; Schultz, 2000; Schultz, 437 
Dayan, and Montague, 1997; Suri, 2002). These midbrain structures are the primary source of 438 
dopamine in the brain (Bjoerklund, 2007; Haber, 2003 for review). One of the major projection 439 
pathways of the dopaminergic system is the mesostriatal pathway (Bjoerklund and Dunnett, 2007 440 
for review), which targets the striatum, a nucleus in the basal ganglia (Bédard et al., 1969; Haber, 441 
2003). Similar to the nigral and tegmental dopaminergic cell assemblies, their projections to the 442 
striatum have repeatedly been shown to be involved in the coding of prediction errors (Daw et al., 443 
2011; Joel, Niv, and Ruppin, 2002; O’Doherty, 2004; Schultz and Dickinson, 2000). Intact 444 
mesostriatal projections seem to be pivotal in learning from feedback (Holl et al., 2012; Shohamy 445 
et al., 2008). More recently, it has been shown that prediction errors in hierarchical reinforcement 446 
settings, which concern predictions of the value of options, are computed in the striatum (Daw et 447 
al., 2011; Diuk et al., 2013; Jin, Tecuapetla, and Costa, 2014). These ﬁndings have fostered the 448 
view that the striatum plays a special role in selecting actions and evaluating their outcomes (e.g., 449 
Frank, Scheres, and Sherman, 2007; Houk et al., 2007; Redgrave, Prescott, and Gurney, 1999).  450 
If hierarchical prediction error coding is important for outcome prediction in actions, one 451 
would expect to ﬁnd signatures of prediction errors when actions do not yield desired or 452 
anticipated outcomes, that is, when subgoals are not achieved. Importantly, this neural signature 453 
should be present even if these subgoals are not directly related to primary reward (cf. Torrecillos 454 
et al., 2014). It is not yet conclusively established that striatal prediction errors are observed when 455 
subjects fail to reach anticipated subgoals (end states of options) that never entail reward delivery, 456 
and do not change the overall estimate of reward likelihood. However, a few studies investigating 457 
prediction errors in perception have yielded evidence that the striatum codes for the 458 
unexpectedness of events per se (den Ouden et al., 2009; Grahn, Parkinson, and Owen, 2008; 459 
Grahn and Rowe, 2013; Schiffer and Schubotz, 2011; Schiffer et al., 2012; Seger et al., 2013) and 460 
is not limited to reward-related prediction error coding. Although unexpected events in these 461 
studies were not predictive of forthcoming reward, or positive feedback, they were sometimes 462 
task-relevant (e.g., Schiffer and Schubotz, 2011), even if only to the degree that they informed 463 
participants that they should pay attention to deviations in a stimulus to increase their ability to 464 
answer (unrewarded) questions correctly (Schiffer et al., 2012). This ﬁnding stands in contrast to 465 
the idea that striatal prediction errors code solely for changes in the expected sum of future 466 
rewards. Rather, it favours the idea that the striatum codes in a model-based fashion for the (un-) 467 
expectedness of events more broadly (Schultz, 2013). One rationale behind this claim is that 468 
humans need to learn about unexpected deviations from their expectations to adapt behaviourally 469 
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to lasting changes in the environment (Behrens et al., 2007; Schiffer et al., 2013). The degree to 470 
which these events need to be related to future reward probability in a complex model of the world 471 
requires further testing.  472 
Continuing interest in the computations of the dopaminergic midbrain and striatum is also 473 
fuelled by the ﬁnding that dopamine’s action on a number of sites within the basal ganglia appears 474 
crucial in establishing associations between cortical representations (such as motor commands and 475 
sensory outcomes) and in choosing actions based on these representations (Bischoff-Grethe, 476 
Crowley, and Arbib, 2002; Frank, 2005; Gurney, Humphries, and Redgrave, 2015; Redgrave, 477 
Prescott, and Gurney, 1999; Stocco, Lebiere, and Anderson, 2010). To understand how basal 478 
ganglia anatomy may hence contribute to goal-directed action selection, we next consider three 479 
prominent features of its neurophysiology:  480 
 481 
1. Cortical projections (’loops’) through the basal ganglia enable associations between 482 
activation patterns in different cortical areas.  483 
2. Projection pathways within the basal ganglia play a role in the acquisition and selection 484 
of extended sequences.  485 
3. Interactions of hierarchical projections in the basal ganglia through subcortical loops 486 
allow context-dependent modulation of task sets.  487 
 488 
3.2 Prediction in cortico-basal ganglia-thalamo-cortical loops  489 
We propose that cognitive control in sequential goal-directed actions is subserved by cortico-basal 490 
ganglia-thalamo-cortical loops, a system proposed to compute predictions of sensory states online 491 
and to link representations of actions to their sensory correlates (Bischoff-Grethe, Crowley, and 492 
Arbib, 2002; Gurney, Prescott, and Redgrave, 2001; Redgrave, Prescott, and Gurney, 1999). The 493 
basal ganglia comprise 9 subcortical nuclei: the caudate nucleus, putamen, and nucleus accumbens 494 
(N.Acc), which are together referred to as the striatum, and the globus pallidus externa (GPe), 495 
globus pallidus interna (GPi), subthalamic nucleus (STN), substantia nigra pars reticulata (SNr), 496 
substantia nigra pars compacta (SNc), and ventral tegmental area (VTA) (Figure 1; Graybiel, 497 
1998; Saint-Cyr, 2003).  498 
A ﬁrst criterion for a neural structure that can function as a sequential predictive action 499 
control system is the capacity to integrate input from a wide range of cortical areas, for example 500 
from sensory, motor, and multimodal association cortices. In fact, the striatum as the input 501 
structure to the basal ganglia shows such a remarkable pattern of connectivity. Virtually the entire 502 
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neocortex projects to the striatum. It thus receives projections from sensory cortices (e.g., Seger, 503 
2008), as well as motor and premotor areas and prefrontal sites (Di Martino et al., 2008; Kemp 504 
and Powell, 1970; Selemon and Goldman-Rakic, 1985; Parent and Hazrati, 1995; Schmahmann 505 
and Pandya, 2008; Schmahmann and Pandya, 2006). For some of these areas, a very distinctive 506 
kind of projection pathway has been established in terms of cortico-basal ganglia-thalamo-cortical 507 
loops (Alexander, DeLong, and Strick, 1986; Haber, 2003; Parent and Hazrati, 1995; Selemon and 508 
Goldman-Rakic, 1985). A key characteristic of these loops is that cortical input areas project to 509 
specific, circumscribed areas within the striatum. The striatal area sends even more converged 510 
projections to the output nuclei of the striatum, the GPi and SNr (Figure 1A). The information is 511 
then transferred via the thalamus back to one of the cortical input regions (Alexander, DeLong, 512 
and Strick, 1986; but see Joel and Weiner, 2000). For example, the motor loop, as ﬁrst described 513 
in the monkey (Alexander, DeLong, and Strick, 1986), has inputs from the supplementary motor 514 
area, the arcuate premotor area, the motor cortex, and the somatosensory cortex. These projections 515 
converge in the same area of the putamen. The putamen then projects to the ventrolateral GPi and 516 
caudolateral SNr. The projection from these output nuclei reaches two speciﬁc thalamic nuclei. 517 
Lastly, the thalamo-cortical projections of the motor loop terminate in the mesial premotor cortex 518 
(supplementary motor area). The same principle can be found in all cortico-basal ganglia-thalamo-519 
cortical loops (Alexander et al., 1986). However, input areas are not necessarily adjacent areas of 520 
neocortex: the executive loop receives input from the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (dlPFC), 521 
posterior parietal cortex (Figure 1A), and arcuate premotor area, all of which target the same area 522 
in the dorsolateral head of the caudate nucleus, which in turn projects via the thalamus back to the 523 
dlPFC (Alexander, DeLong, and Strick, 1986; Selemon and Goldman-Rakic, 1985). Projections 524 
from non-adjacent areas of the cortex into overlapping or interdigitating areas of the striatum are 525 
one aspect of basal ganglia neuroanatomy that may contribute to the role of this system in 526 
integration of information.  527 
The proposed predictive control system incorporates the characteristic of sequentiality con-528 
necting predictions of present states, motor intentions, and sensory outcomes. Thus, a second 529 
criterion for a system supporting predictive sequential control is access to representations of 530 
planned movements, as well as their end states, which in turn form the preconditions of 531 
subsequent actions within a sequence. One important aspect of the loop structure satisfying this 532 
condition is that output states are fed back into the system (Berns and Sejnowski, 1998; Stocco, 533 
Lebiere, and Anderson, 2010). On the motor level, for example, projections of the representation 534 
of the hand and digits in the motor cortex (handknob; Yousry et al., 1997) interdigitate in the 535 
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striatum with the projections from the hand area in primary sensory cortex (S1; Graybiel, 1998; 536 
Flaherty and Graybiel, 1991). Projections from different areas reach the dendritic spines of so-537 
called medium spiny neurons within the same patches in the striatum (matrisomes, cf. Graybiel, 538 
1998; Flaherty and Graybiel, 1991; Flaherty and Graybiel, 1993). This physiological property of 539 
projections to the striatum may provide neural templates (Graybiel, 1998) for the association of 540 
different cortical input and output patterns (Houk and Wise, 1995; Graybiel, 1998), in a process 541 
modulated by dopamine (see below).  542 
On a more general level, these forward models can be described as the association of a 543 
motor command, action, or choice (Houk and Wise, 1995; Houk et al., 2007) with sensory states 544 
(Bischoff-Grethe, Crowley, and Arbib, 2002) or multimodal representations (cf. Stocco, Lebiere, 545 
and Anderson, 2010). In cognitive terms, we can thus rephrase these associations as iteratively 546 
linking the representation of a present state (or context, Apicella, 2007) with sequential action 547 
possibilities to reach a desired goal state. Sequential representations in the basal ganglia are 548 
known as chunks (Graybiel, 2008; 2005; 1998a). This functional description and terminology 549 
dovetails with the concepts of chunks in HRL, denoting an action sequence that can be treated as 550 
an entity.  551 
A third condition for a system that selects sequential (chunked) action is that predictions of 552 
action outcomes need temporal precision, for example because delayed sensory input may be 553 
indicative of failed actions (cf. Sardo et al., 2000). Importantly, associations between converging 554 
inputs in the striatum may be linked within a deﬁned time window (provided in the striatum by so 555 
called tonically active neurons, TANs; Morris et al., 2004; Sardo et al., 2000). It has been proposed 556 
that activation in the striatal projection neurons is modulated by activity levels of TANs 557 
(Reynolds, Hyland, and Wickens, 2001; Reynolds and Wickens, 2002; Apicella, 2007). 558 
Speciﬁcally, cessation of TAN activity may allow striatal projection neurons to become active and 559 
transmit information. TANs may thus provide a timestamp for associations to become active and 560 
acquired (Smith et al., 2004; see Stocco, Lebiere, and Anderson, 2010 for a computational 561 
implementation), allowing predictive sequential models of motor command copy, anticipated 562 
sensory consequence, and subsequent motor command copy, wherein states are kept separate to 563 
allow successive implementation. It is important to keep in mind that while this example focuses 564 
on the motor loop, the same principle holds for loops originating in prefrontal areas, with sensory 565 
state representations that are likely to be multimodal (Saint-Cyr, 2003; Seger, 2008).  566 
A fourth criterion for a control system of sequential actions is the ability to detect 567 
deviations from intended sequences and signal these deviations to allow behavioural adjustments. 568 
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An emerging view is that the basal ganglia are involved in selecting action sequences (Graybiel, 569 
1998) and monitoring to detect deviations both within the sequence, as well as at the outcome 570 
level (Carr, 2000; Graybiel, 1998; Grahn and Rowe, 2013). As we have seen, basal ganglia 571 
connectivity provides the essential features to support the monitoring of sequentiality (Stocco, 572 
Lebiere, and Anderson, 2010), based on its ability to associate sequential representations from 573 
various cortical inputs while discriminating serial positions. Mismatch signals in the basal ganglia 574 
may hence code for deviations from the sequence even if they do not change the predictions of 575 
future primary reward. The dopaminergic signal established in (H)RL may be one example of 576 
such a signal of deviation. We next describe why dopaminergic prediction errors in the basal 577 
ganglia may specifically play an essential role in extended sequential action, owing to dopamine’s 578 
role in the acquisition and selection of weighted forward models.  579 
 580 
3.3 Probabilistic selection in basal ganglia pathways  581 
The ability to select appropriate actions to achieve internal goals is fundamental to cognitive 582 
control. Because most contexts are preconditions for a number of actions, action selection must 583 
take into account how likely it is that each possible action is appropriate (Collins and Koechlin, 584 
2012; Donoso, Collins and Koechlin, 2014) and will yield the anticipated outcome. Action 585 
selection can be efficient and fast if different alternatives are associated with weights that 586 
encompass this probability, and selection occurs based on these weights. Within the basal ganglia, 587 
acquisition of these probabilistically weighted forward models is held to depend on two key 588 
organisational features: the distribution of the dopaminergic receptors on medium spiny neurons in 589 
dual projection pathways in basal ganglia loops, and the consequences of dopaminergic action on 590 
these receptors.  591 
Within each cortico-basal ganglia-thalamo-cortical loop, there are three separate projection 592 
pathways, of which two have opposing effects on cortical activity. These two pathways are 593 
associated with different dopaminergic receptors. One type of dopamine receptor (D1 type), 594 
located on dendrites of medium spiny neurons, gives rise to the direct projection pathway (Albin, 595 
Young, and Penney, 1989; Smith et al., 1998; Bolam et al., 2009). This projection pathway 596 
reaches the output structures GPi and SNr monosynaptically, which in turn project to the 597 
thalamus. Activation of D1 receptors disinhibits the thalamus via this direct projection pathway. 598 
Disinhibition of the thalamus increases cortical activity, such that activation in the direct pathway 599 
leads to increased activity of corresponding cortical output patterns. This pathway has thus been 600 
dubbed the ‘go pathway’ (Figure 1A; Frank, 2005; Frank, Seeberger, and O’Reilly, 2004). 601 
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Conversely, striatal neurons that express another type of dopamine receptor, so-called D2 602 
receptors, send projections to the GPe. The GPe projects to the STN, which in turn projects to the 603 
GPi and SNr output nuclei and thence to the thalamus. If dopamine binds to D2 receptors, these 604 
indirect pathway projections lead to inhibition of thalamic activity and accordingly no increase in 605 
cortical activity. Therefore, the indirect projection pathway via the GPe and STN has been called 606 
the ‘no go pathway’ (Frank, Seeberger, and O’Reilly, 2004; Figure 1b). The third pathway, the 607 
hyperdirect pathway, will not be discussed further, but its relevance to action selection has been 608 
described elsewhere (e.g., in Frank, 2006; Jahfari et al., 2012; Nambu, Tokuno, and Takada, 2002; 609 
Nambu, 2004). Importantly, current models suggest that each forward model is represented 610 
simultaneously in separate sets of medium spiny neurons within the direct and indirect pathways 611 
(Frank, 2005; Gurney, Humphries, and Redgrave, 2015). This means that activation of each 612 
cortical representation depends on the dominance of its respective representation in the ‘go’ 613 
pathway compared to the ‘no go’ pathway. 614 
Historically, models of the direct and indirect pathway have focussed on their role in 615 
selecting actions in relation to current dopamine levels. However, recent models that very 616 
successfully predict behaviour in patients with Parkinson’s disease (PD; Frank, Seeberger, and 617 
O’Reilly, 2004; Frank, 2005; Frank, 2006; Frank et al., 2007) have focused on the role of 618 
dopamine bursts in shaping learning in the basal ganglia, thus inﬂuencing the probabilistic 619 
dominance of ‘go’ and ‘no go’ activity in future action selection (Frank, 2005; see Gurney, 620 
Humphries, and Redgrave, 2015 for a very recent model which compares striatal action selection 621 
and learning). Specifically, activation of D1 receptors on the medium spiny neurons, which give 622 
rise to the direct pathway, results in long-term potentiation (LTP) of synaptic efficacy. At the 623 
same time, D2 receptor activation prevents LTP on these synapses (Reynolds and Wickens, 2002). 624 
If a representation of cortical activity in the striatum is accompanied by a dopamine burst, this 625 
hence leads to increased synaptic strength for the representation in the direct pathway and possibly 626 
a concurrent decrease in synaptic strength for the representation in the indirect pathway. Thus, in 627 
the motor domain, dopamine bursts teach both pathways to make one response more likely, while 628 
concurrent alternative responses are suppressed (Morris, Schmidt, and Bergman, 2010; Frank, 629 
2005 for a review). With reference to the RL literature, these dopaminergically modulated 630 
synaptic weight changes can explain why rewarded actions are chosen with increasing probability 631 
(Bogacz and Gurney, 2007; Botvinick, Niv, and Barto, 2009; Frank and Claus, 2006; Gurney, 632 
Prescott, and Redgrave, 2001; Gurney, Humphries, and Redgrave, 2015).  633 
 19 
LTP in the two-pathway account is very useful in explaining how forward models can be 634 
strengthened. However, perhaps due to a historical view of the basal ganglia as a pure motor 635 
structure, and perhaps because dopaminergic modulation has been predominantly associated with 636 
reward (but see Horvitz, 2000 for an early dissenting view; Redgrave and Gurney, 2006 for a 637 
review), action selection in the basal ganglia pathway has often been taken to be the exact 638 
opposite of cognitive control: Selection in the basal ganglia has been associated with reward-639 
oriented habitual responses, whereas cognitive control focuses on the implementation of novel or 640 
instructed tasks, especially if the task is not directed at the most salient stimuli or most dominant 641 
response. However, dopamine-driven action selection can be reconciled with the proposed role of 642 
the basal ganglia circuits in outcome prediction for non-rewarding action outcomes if the 643 
hierarchical nature of actions and projection pathways in the basal ganglia is taken into account 644 
(Graybiel, 1998).  645 
As we will see, recent descriptions of basal ganglia connectivity (Haber, 2003; Draganski 646 
et al., 2008) point to an involvement in cognitive control that is even more intriguing than 647 
monitoring of sequential steps and acquisition of probabilistic forward models for rewarded 648 
actions. Speciﬁcally, these structures have been implicated in mediating top-down control by 649 
anterior prefrontal areas (representations of abstract, high-level goals) over more posterior areas in 650 
frontal cortex (representations of concrete actions). These recent ﬁndings suggest interplay 651 
between projections from input areas holding representations at different levels of action 652 
hierarchies (Haber, 2003; Koechlin and Hyaﬁl, 2007). As we will discuss next, understanding 653 
these hierarchically organised striato-nigral loops may contribute substantially to our 654 
understanding how information flows from areas representing abstract action plans to areas 655 
representing lower-level actions (Badre and D’Esposito, 2009; Koechlin and Hyaﬁl, 2007).  656 
 657 
3.4 Multiple projection hierarchies in the basal ganglia  658 
Recent physiological and computational investigations of basal ganglia connectivity have focussed 659 
on interconnectivity between the striatum and the SN/VTA complex (Haber, 2003; Draganski et 660 
al., 2008; Haruno and Kawato, 2006). These subcortical loops provide a compelling explanation 661 
of the impact of orbitofrontal and prefrontal inputs on biasing action selection in the striatum 662 
(Frank and Claus, 2006; Desrochers and Badre, 2012; Haber, 2003; Haruno and Kawato, 2006; 663 
Karamati & Gutkin, 2013). A simpliﬁed account of the role of these subcortical loops is that the 664 
ventromedial striatum inﬂuences the dorsolateral striatum via its projections to the dorsal tier of 665 
the substantia nigra, which sends dopaminergic projections to the dorsolateral striatum. 666 
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Dopaminergic innervation of the dorsolateral striatum is thus under the inﬂuence of the 667 
ventromedial striatum. This is relevant because different parts of the prefrontal cortex project to 668 
the ventromedial and dorsolateral striatum (Alexander, DeLong, and Strick, 1986; Crittenden and 669 
Graybiel, 2011; Desrochers and Badre, 2012; Draganski et al., 2008; Eblen and Graybiel, 1995; 670 
Haber, 2003; Figure 1B). 671 
A very detailed model of these projections (Haber, 2003), recently supported by diffusion 672 
tensor imaging (DTI; Draganski et al., 2008), describes these striato-nigral loops as spiralling 673 
downwards from striatal projection zones corresponding to anterior prefrontal areas to projection 674 
zones corresponding to posterior prefrontal and motor areas. This spiral largely follows the rostro-675 
caudal axis of the PFC that has been related to the level of abstraction of representations (Badre & 676 
D’Esposito, 2009; Koechlin, Ody, and Kouneiher, 2003). Because the OFC and ventromedial 677 
prefrontal cortex (vmPFC) lie anterior to the dlPFC, and their projection zones in the striatum 678 
follow a similar gradient, the described projections enable striatal projection zones of the OFC and 679 
vmPFC to modulate dopaminergic innervation of the dlPFC’s striatal projection zones via the 680 
striato-nigral loops. The striatal projection zone of the dlPFC in turn modulates dopaminergic 681 
projections to the striatal projection zone of premotor cortex. Because dopamine is relevant to the 682 
selection of representations, these projections may provide a mechanism by which rostral (higher-683 
order) prefrontal representations bias selection in more caudal areas (Figure 1B). 684 
Within our HRL framework, modulation of striatal representations of dlPFC input by OFC 685 
projections is particularly interesting in relation to the concepts of option availability and of action 686 
selection within options (Stalnaker et al., 2014; Wilson et al., 2014). The OFC has been associated 687 
with coding the present states, i.e., states affording different options (Wilson et al., 2014). Support 688 
for this claim comes from a study showing that OFC codes for transitions between states that 689 
afford different options, even if each state has the same reward value (Stalnaker et al., 2014). In 690 
this study, Stalnaker and colleagues used single-cell recordings to show that OFC neurons do not 691 
only convey information about reward value. Rather, they also signalled the beginning of a new 692 
experimental block, even if reward value remained unchanged while sensory features of the 693 
rewards changed. 694 
In contrast to this role for OFC, the dlPFC has been associated with representation of rules 695 
that guide actions (Wilson et al., 2014). One tantalising idea is that the OFC representation of the 696 
current state can bias selection of actions represented in the dlPFC via its connectivity to the 697 
striatum and midbrain dopaminergic system, initiating weight-changes between different 698 
probabilistic forward models in the striatal pathways (Badre and Frank, 2012; Frank and Badre, 699 
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2012). A recently presented model by Frank and Badre (2012) exploits the hierarchical setup of 700 
fronto-striatal and striato-nigral loops to explain hierarchical action selection in a reward context. 701 
Their model posits that more rostral frontal areas inﬂuence which striatal representations of input 702 
from more caudal cortical areas are facilitated in the direct pathway. In support of this model, the 703 
same authors presented fMRI data in a companion paper (Badre and Frank, 2012) suggesting that 704 
contextual representations of (hidden) task rules in the prefrontal cortex bias the selection of 705 
premotor representations in the basal ganglia.  706 
Both lines of research (Badre and Frank, 2012; Frank and Badre, 2012; Stalnaker et al., 707 
2014) suggest that multiple subcortical projection pathways are involved in action selection of 708 
nested hierarchies (spanning from states signifying available options, via representations of 709 
currently active task rules, to motor commands). A similar hierarchical account of cortico-710 
subcortical projection pathways has recently been used to explain drug-seeking behaviour 711 
(Keramati & Gutkin, 2013), which was previously discussed in terms of reinforcement learning 712 
(Wise, 2004). These ﬁndings warrant further research, not least because the role that speciﬁc 713 
frontal areas play in this rostro-caudal axis of the fronto-striatal loop remain a matter of debate: 714 
Very similar functions have been ascribed to different cortical areas (e.g., in  Badre and Frank, 715 
2012 and Wilson et al., 2014) and, conversely, dissimilar functions have been proposed for nearly 716 
identical areas of cortex (compare for example Badre and Frank, 2012 and Derrfuss et al., 2005). 717 
Further, while some studies point towards involvement of the basal ganglia in sensory predictions 718 
and sensory prediction-error coding (den Ouden et al., 2009; Grahn et al., 2013; Schiffer and 719 
Schubotz, 2011; Schiffer et al., 2012), it is yet to be tested empirically whether neural networks 720 
involved in HRL support outcome prediction and action selection in non-reward contexts as 721 
proposed. Each of these questions of functional neuroanatomy needs to be followed up in future 722 
research.  723 
 724 
4 Outcomes in Cognitive Control  725 
 726 
In ﬁrst three sections of this review we have presented evidence for the role of outcomes in action 727 
selection, and their relative neglect in cognitive control paradigms. We have discussed how the 728 
role of outcomes in action selection is well-established in RL and HRL. Moreover, by considering 729 
the apparent relevance of basal ganglia projection pathways in reward prediction, we have 730 
described how the physiological properties of the basal ganglia could support the implementation 731 
and evaluation of chunked sequential actions. The remainder of this review will discuss the 732 
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proposition that cognitive control—the ability to implement necessary actions to achieve desired 733 
outcomes—should beneﬁt from explicit representation of outcomes. We will review evidence for 734 
the importance of an intact basal ganglia network for cognitive control and outcome anticipation, 735 
then discuss additional evidence for the role of outcomes in control based on behavioural and 736 
electrophysiological paradigms in healthy subjects. Lastly, we will consider the characteristics of 737 
experiments that might uncover the putative beneﬁts of outcome representations in adaptive 738 
cognitive control.  739 
 740 
4.1 Evidence for basal ganglia contributions to cognitive control and outcome 741 
prediction  742 
Recent computational models stress the role of the basal ganglia in cognitive control 743 
(Gurney, Prescott, and Redgrave, 2001; Hazy, Frank, and O’Reilly, 2007; O’Reilly and Frank, 744 
2006; O’Reilly, 2006; Stocco, Lebiere, and Anderson, 2010). Evidence from research into the 745 
cognitive changes experienced by Huntington’s disease (HD) and Parkinson’s disease (PD) 746 
patients support these models. Both of these neurological conditions affect the basal ganglia and 747 
lead to cognitive as well as motor impairments. Whereas HD is signiﬁed by cell death in the 748 
striatum (Kowall, Ferrante and Martin, 1987), the primary neural signature in PD is a loss of 749 
dopaminergic cells in the substantia nigra (Bernheimer et al., 1973; Riederer and Wuketich, 1976).  750 
Perhaps the most frequently studied cognitive control functions in these patients are task 751 
switching and response inhibition in go/no-go paradigms. Both HD and PD patients show larger 752 
behavioural costs of task switching (Aron et al., 2003; Cools, 2006; Cools et al., 2001; Cools et 753 
al., 2003; Holl et al., 2012; Shook et al., 2005). PD patients’ task-switching deﬁcit appears 754 
particularly pronounced for switches to non-habitual behaviour compared to habitual behaviour 755 
(Cameron et al., 2010). This selective impairment supports the argument that the projections  of 756 
the basal ganglia’s dopaminergic system are involved in selecting appropriate actions, rather than 757 
habitual responses. Deﬁcits in cognitive control paradigms such as the Stroop colour-word task, 758 
the trailmaking test, and the Tower of London task are also particularly well-established for 759 
Parkinson’s disease (Nobili et al., 2010; Robbins et al., 1994). The Tower of London task requires 760 
participants to plan multiple steps ahead before implementing a movement sequence. The fact that 761 
PD patients take longer for this planning phase (Robbins et al., 1994), during which subsequent 762 
states and movements must be emulated and evaluated, is particularly interesting given the idea 763 
that the basal ganglia play an important role in outcome anticipation. Moreover, PD patients do 764 
not show predictive strategies in motor tasks (Crawford et al., 1989; Flowers, 1978). Lastly, error 765 
 23 
detection is compromised in PD (Ito and Kitagawa, 2006) and in patients with focal basal ganglia 766 
lesions (Ullsperger and von Cramon, 2006), similarly indicating a compromised ability to evaluate 767 
action outcomes.  768 
Results implicating the basal ganglia in outcome prediction have also been obtained by 769 
Holl and colleagues (2012). The authors showed that the presence of feedback in a probabilistic 770 
classiﬁcation learning task (the Weather Prediction Task; Knowlton, Squire, and Gluck, 1994) 771 
determines whether the basal ganglia will be recruited. They also replicated an earlier ﬁnding that 772 
patients with basal ganglia impairments are particularly impaired in implicit learning from 773 
feedback (Shohamy et al., 2008 for review). Another intriguing result for the role of the basal 774 
ganglia in task switching comes from a TMS study (van Schouwenburg et al., 2012) showing that 775 
dopamine levels in the putamen inﬂuence task-switching abilities. Collectively, these studies 776 
suggest that compromised performance in cognitive control tasks associated with basal ganglia 777 
disorders may be explained by the structure’s role in outcome prediction and evaluation. In 778 
addition to this clinical evidence, we will now discuss empirical evidence for the relevance of 779 
outcomes on performance from cognitive control paradigms directly.  780 
 781 
4.2 Evidence for the role of outcomes in action selection 782 
Our hypothesis is that representations of predicted outcomes should play a key role in selecting 783 
extended sequential actions. While this key question has rarely been addressed in research on 784 
cognitive control to date, the role of outcomes for selection of non-sequential, individual actions 785 
has been investigated within the framework of ideomotor control theory (here, outcomes are often 786 
referred to as action effects). As reviewed above, the ideomotor principle posits that anticipated 787 
action effects (sensory consequences of actions) are incorporated into the representation of 788 
actions, creating a bi-directional link between actions and action effects (Band et al., 2009; 789 
Herwig, Prinz, and Waszak, 2007; Hommel, 2009; James, 1890; Prinz, 1990; see Lukas, Philipp, 790 
and Koch, 2012; Janczyk, Heinemann, and Pﬁster, 2012; Gaschler and Nattkemper, 2012; 791 
Ziessler, Nattkemper, and Vogt, 2012 for recent applications of the paradigm). 792 
Solid evidence has been gathered that the predictability of a sensory consequence limits the 793 
surprise response to these effects (Band et al., 2009; Bednark et al., 2013), in line with the 794 
proposal that outcome representations are activated when actions are selected. Band and 795 
colleagues (2009) implemented auditory sensory outcomes in a four-response task-switching 796 
paradigm. They did not find that responses with predictable outcomes were performed faster, but 797 
did observe response slowing on trials following unexpected outcomes. Neural recordings 798 
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dovetailed with the behavioural results, in that unpredictable outcomes elicited an event related 799 
potential (ERP) component resembling those seen following rare negative feedback. This ﬁnding 800 
was recently substantiated by a study showing that unexpected action outcomes elicit larger ERPs 801 
when they carry informative value concerning the correctness of a response (Bednark et al., 2013). 802 
Although these studies emphasise the association between actions and outcomes, they typically do 803 
not report a beneﬁt of outcome predictability at the selection stage (Band et al., 2009; Lukas, 804 
Philipp, and Koch, 2012). On the other hand, as reviewed below, a few recent studies have shown 805 
that anticipating an outcome can facilitate action selection (Marien, Aarts, and Custers, 2012; 806 
Ruge, Müller, and Braver, 2010; Ziessler, Nattkemper, and Vogt, 2012).  807 
Together, these existing fragments of evidence begin to suggest that anticipation or 808 
presentation of action outcomes can inﬂuence high-level action selection. Adding arbitrary but 809 
predictable sensory effects to task sets may have little effect on participants’ ability to perform the 810 
task but may delay performance of the following response. However, it cannot be ruled out that 811 
this effect is owing to increased processing demands, or a reorienting effect caused by the 812 
surprise. In fact, the described cortico-basal ganglia-thalamo-cortical loop model of action 813 
selection suggests that ordinary sensory effects of button presses should suffice to inform 814 
participants about the correctness of their response as long as the rules of the task set are known. 815 
According to the model, for each response set, representations of the stimuli are associated with 816 
representations of their respective correct responses (motor command and expected sensory 817 
feedback) within the striatum. Failure of the correct sensory feedback to occur, or an unpredicted 818 
sensory event occurring, would elicit a prediction error that can be used to evaluate the correctness 819 
of the response (cf. Holroyd and Coles, 2002).  820 
 821 
4.3 Evidence that meaningful outcomes facilitate associated actions  822 
The studies reviewed in the previous section found reliable but limited impact of arbitrary sensory 823 
action effects. In contrast, more robust outcome effects have been observed in a set of studies for 824 
which outcomes are inherent in (or intrinsic to) the task and are meaningfully related to the actions 825 
performed (Marien, Aarts, and Custers, 2012; Ruge, Müller, and Braver, 2010; Ziessler, 826 
Nattkemper, and Vogt, 2012). Methodologically, the studies are very different from each other, 827 
but they share the critical common feature of having semantic coherence between actions and 828 
outcomes. It seems plausible that this core feature of everyday behaviour is essential to bringing 829 
about effects of outcome utility in future cognitive control paradigms.  830 
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One study showing that selection of simple actions beneﬁts from the presence of 831 
contingent outcomes was reported by Ziessler and colleagues (2012). This study found a 832 
behavioural beneﬁt of a match between an imperative stimulus and an action effect, using object 833 
and grip-type affordances as ‘go’ stimuli and sensory effects in a go/no-go paradigm (Ziessler, 834 
Nattkemper, and Vogt, 2012). When images of objects were used as stimuli, actions were 835 
performed faster if pictures of object-compatible grip types served as the action effect. The same 836 
effect was established when grip types were used as ‘go’ stimuli and compatible objects as action 837 
effects. This paradigm thereby exploits overlearned associations between objects and grip types. 838 
Facilitation of action execution by presentation of objects has previously been shown (Grèzes et 839 
al., 2003), but the study is interesting in that the authors show that this priming effect can be used 840 
to elicit an arbitrarily associated response. While this type of finding is usually taken to 841 
corroborate the ideomotor principle (Ziessler, Nattkemper, and Vogt, 2012; cf. Kunde, 2001), we 842 
argue that anticipation of outcomes facilitates action selection (as posited by ideomotor theory) 843 
and further allows the agent to chunk actions into nested hierarchies and to monitor their 844 
successful completion (as implied by the application of HRL principles to cognitive control).  845 
Facilitation of action selection at higher levels of organization has been observed in an 846 
fMRI study by Ruge, Müller, and Braver (2010), who showed that the cost of switching tasks is 847 
slightly but reliably decreased when feedback for a response (sensory outcome) is delivered in the 848 
same (spatial) dimension as the original response, compared to feedback with no spatial or 849 
response-related properties. Switches in the spatial feedback condition activated a neural network 850 
associated with allocation of spatial attention in a personal reference frame comprised of anterior 851 
intraparietal sulcus, dorsal premotor cortex and rostral cingulate zone (Ruge, Müller, and Braver, 852 
2010). 853 
Moreover, a study by Marien, Aarts and Custers (2012) investigated the effect of changing 854 
the colour used to identify the target stimulus in a pair of letters. The crucial manipulation was 855 
whether subjects represented the task in terms of its goal—to classify the letter as a vowel or 856 
consonant—or in terms of its means—to focus on a particular colour (by virtue of the instructions 857 
they were given). Goal representations led to more effective switching, particularly when pre-858 
switch responses were rewarded (Marien, Aarts, and Custers, 2013; 2012).  859 
Within the framework we present, these effects can be explained by the fact that in all 860 
studies participants were motivated to chunk representations of motor commands together with 861 
representations of indicators of successful actions beyond the re-afference delivered by the motor 862 
response. Ziessler et al. (2012) achieved this by exploiting learned associations between stimuli 863 
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that act as preconditions to specific responses and said response. Ruge and colleagues suggest that 864 
their participants experienced spatially compatible visual outcomes of their responses as effects of 865 
their actions. Marien, Aarts and Custers (2012) prompted participants to use representations of 866 
higher-level action-outcomes for action selection, using instructions that emphasized the goal of 867 
the task as opposed to the stimulus-response mapping. These interpretations are in line with a 868 
computational account which suggests that action selection requires basal ganglia-driven updating 869 
of working memory representations (Frank, Loughry, and O’Reilly, 2001; O’Reilly, 2006; 870 
O’Reilly and Frank, 2006; Donoso, Collins, and Koechlin, 2014). Translated to the terminology of 871 
this model, the present claim would be that chunking of stimulus-response mappings into options 872 
(task sets) yields performance benefits in all three paradigms because working memory updating 873 
of options is not required in switch trials when outcomes are represented at a higher level of 874 
abstraction, but updating is required when switching between stimulus-response mappings. To 875 
return to our initial example: on return visits to different countries we do not need to retrace our 876 
steps along speciﬁc routes to buy dinner; instead, we are able to acquire, select, and switch 877 
fluently between different situation-specific options for achieving a particular overarching goal, 878 
such as choosing to buy food at a gas station in one country versus a convenience store in another.  879 
 880 
5 Conclusion and a look ahead  881 
We have outlined a hypothesis that situates basal ganglia function within an HRL framework to 882 
integrate existing work on action-effect binding, reinforcement learning, and cognitive control. In 883 
the present review we have explored the relationship between these concepts, to develop the 884 
proposal that prediction and evaluation of outcomes—specifically, of subgoals within action 885 
sequences—underpin the selection and monitoring of extended sequential actions. In line with 886 
recent proposals about the computational and neural basis of HRL, we propose that extended 887 
action sequences can be chunked and then represented and selected as coherent options. On the 888 
basis of computational models and anatomical properties of the basal ganglia, we argue that 889 
control of chunked, extended sequential actions relies on dopaminergic modulation of a network 890 
of recurrent loops connecting cortical and subcortical components, with this control extending 891 
beyond situations where subgoals are signified by primary reward. 892 
This proposal has two key implications. The ﬁrst is in terms of identifying a template for 893 
future research on the topic of outcome-guided sequential action. Classical paradigms may not be 894 
able to show the beneﬁt of prediction on the action level, because sensory consequences of 895 
responses already hold sufficient information to evaluate task performance. New paradigms to 896 
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investigate the role of outcomes in cognitive control must contain features that allow testing of the 897 
following behavioural predictions:  898 
 899 
 Introducing predictable outcomes into cognitive control tasks should improve action-900 
selection compared to absent or unpredictable outcomes, but only if those outcomes 901 
provide performance feedback that is not encompassed fully in the sensory feedback of the 902 
action.  903 
 In task switching designs, transitions to new tasks should be performed faster if informa-904 
tion about task-outcome contingencies is available than if the relationship between tasks 905 
and outcomes is ambiguous.  906 
 In a sequence of tasks, progression from one task to the next should be faster if the end of 907 
each subtask is signiﬁed by an individual outcome, as opposed to identical outcomes for 908 
different subtasks.  909 
 In a sequence of tasks, confusion of subtasks (errors of order) should be decreased if each 910 
subtask is signiﬁed by an individual outcome, as opposed to identical outcomes for 911 
different subtasks.  912 
 Patients suffering from neurological disorders of the basal ganglia should show reduced 913 
modulation of task performance by introducing predictable outcomes than healthy controls 914 
in tasks with established outcome effects on cognitive control.  915 
 916 
The other key implication of the proposed model is the requirement to develop novel 917 
paradigms to substantiate the proposed basal ganglia-mediated interactions between rostral 918 
prefrontal/orbitofrontal and more posterior prefrontal sites in extended action selection, and to 919 
determine the exact role of speciﬁc subcortical projection pathways in top-down biased action 920 
selection. Of particular interest is the investigation of the most anterior prefrontal sites in 921 
representing present option states and of how these state representations are translated into 922 
narrower task representations in more posterior sites.  923 
 924 
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